The Coronavirus and the Limits of Capitalism

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“Lankenau Hospital” by Montgomery County Planning Commission licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0

It’s easy to look at the coronavirus as a one of a kind.  After all, who expected this cataclysm that came from nowhere?   How could anyone have predicted it?

In fact the world is full of low-probability events that you have to care about.   The coronavirus is on a par with airplane crashes and oil-rig explosions.  Capitalism is not good at dealing with any of them.

There’s a myth about that sort of thing.  Of course we don’t need airline or aircraft regulation, because the companies in question know what a disaster would mean and will take care that such things don’t happen.  That’s a nice story, but it’s false.   People don’t get promoted because of events that didn’t happen.  They do get promoted by saving money wasted on something that’s never going to occur.

If you’re going to stop that sort of thing from happening, you need a different mindset.  Government has to spend money on regulation and public health and safe, comprehensive infrastructure.   No one else is going to do it.  We now know unequivocally that we decided we didn’t have to care about the CDC.  It has come back to haunt us.  There’s more where that came from.

In fact there’s a whole bunch of other things we’ve decided we don’t have to care about.  After all, “I don’t have to care” has been the liberating elixir of our age.  Many of these we’ve talked about before, but it’s worth recalling some here:

Climate change

Avoiding a depression (clearly relevant now)

Nuclear proliferation

Losing our edge in science and technology

We’ve washed our hands of all of this, blithely punting to a private sector that is no more prepared than for the coronavirus.

The message from the coronavirus is that bad things really can happen, no matter how much we may want to avoid thinking about them.

The coronavirus is the canary in the mine.   We’ll get over it somehow, but we’ve had our warning.

Regulation

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“Boeing 737-8 MAX at BFI (N8702L)” by wilco737 is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

I was struck by an article in today’s NY Times about a new scandal around the Boeing 737 MAX.  Apparently there was another Boeing 737 crash in 2009 where similar issues (for an earlier 737 version) were hushed up under US pressure.

The scandal was shocking enough, but what provoked this piece was the discussion of cultural issues at Boeing—specifically the attitude toward the FAA.   There were many quotes from emails talking about regulators as barriers to be overcome by any means necessary.  If you believe the project manager emails, there was no recognition of any legitimate concern at all.

That’s horrifying.  It’s a serious problem with Boeing’s culture. However, it’s important to recognize that the situation is not unique.  The relationship of a regulator with the regulated company is always adversarial and difficult.  The issue goes beyond Boeing.

I worked for some years for telephone companies, at Bell Labs and later at GTE.  We were a regulated utility.  The role of the regulator was less critical—what was at stake was service quality and cost—but they did have a significant influence on what happened.  We didn’t regard them as hostile exactly, but overall the culture was that we provided good service more despite them than because of them.  From the inside that’s what happens.  Even at a working level, you see your side of the picture.  And phone companies are anything but angels.

That’s precisely why regulation is important.  You can’t let the regulated companies tell you in all sincerity that the regulators are idiots and the process is nuts.  They always will.

At the EPA and elsewhere we’ve now decided that the only people worth listening to are the regulated.  We’re all passengers on a 737 MAX.