On Top of the Heap

We’ve been there for more than 75 years, since the end of World War II.  We are the power that maintains the world order. As such we’ve overseen a remarkable period of growing global (and our own) prosperity.  People from both political parties agree that we are the ones that make things happen.  We’re so comfortable with that role we’ve come to believe it is ours by right and permanent.

Recently though our attitudes toward that role have changed.  We’ve now decided that since we’re in position to run the world, we ought to be able to keep more of the benefits for ourselves.  So instead of maintaining that world order, we’re now in it for everything we can get—confident that the sky is now the limit.

However we have found there’s a hitch.  We attacked a medium-sized country—Iran–to put them in their place, and we didn’t win.  Not only that, an even more minor power—Ukraine—has shown itself more capable of defending our allies than we are. We still have more bombs and aircraft carriers than anyone else, but somehow that doesn’t do the job anymore.  And the problem is getting worse.  We’ve been so preoccupied with China, we haven’t noticed that the problem is not just that.

With nuclear proliferation, computer-controlled drones, and rapidly evolving AI the past pecking order no longer holds.  Instead the future looks considerably more chaotic—with murky and changing notions of international strength and weakness and risks of conflict from both overconfidence and paranoia.  When we tell everybody our new story—that powerful countries should be able to do anything they want to everybody else (because that’s the way it ought to be)—it not always so clear which side of the story is us.  And lowering the threshold to war isn’t necessarily such a great idea either.

Whether we want to admit it or not, we were pretty stupid in the Iran war.  We ignored obvious issues when we attacked, and we were so overconfident that we didn’t do even the most basic job of preparing for the fight.  We didn’t win.  But that’s not the end of it.  Our changed notion of international roles was equally stupid and blind.  We gave up on the idea of international order just when we actually need it, when we can no longer count on always ruling the roost.

Neither problem has a simple solution.  We’re going to come out of the Iran war worse off than when we started.  It’s hard even to guess what we’ll have to give up.  For the world order things are different.  We have proven that a reasonable world order can benefit everyone (at least generally).  We don’t have to be able to shakedown everyone else.  We just have to participate in recreating and inventing conditions for international success.  That must now include addressing climate change, for example, in addition to preventing war.  The job is not simple but the choice itself is: we can either help to create a livable world or suffer in nuclear-armed chaos.

Disconnects

One of the biggest problems with politics in this country is assumed connections that simply don’t exist.  DOGE and the closing of USAID and other government programs were money in the bank for the Trump base (instead it went to tax cuts for the rich).  Getting rid of immigrants would leave more of the pot of gold for everyone else (but growing the pot is the big issue and immigrants are contributors).   The reason we can’t have free public college here is that the Europeans didn’t contribute enough to NATO (though the Republican Party has consistently blocked any such public services).  And of course the big one—making rich people richer will trickle down to everyone else (which has never happened anywhere—they just get more power to help them keep it).

You have to be really careful with anyone’s tacitly-assumed connections.  Even if they existed in the past, there’s no guarantee they’re going to continue as before.  The particular case I want to talk about is the assumed link between national power (military and corporate) and population well-being.  For most of the 20th century that link really was true.  That’s Trump’s factory economy with good jobs and the corporate might that won two world wars.  But that’s not the reality today–manufacturing is 8% of GDP, unions cover 10% of workers, and many service sectors are low-wage and dead-end.  It’s even less the reality going forward.  The AI world is simply not going to supply that kind of employment-linked prosperity—there will be good jobs but not so many of them for a good long while. Experts spill ink arguing about the impact of AI, but the desperation of new college graduates (and current students) is the real world.

Many people have compared AI to the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century.  Britain at the time was the most powerful and prosperous country that had ever existed.  It was a world of fabulous wealth and horrendous destitution, both domestically and in its empire.  Eventually the world was able to adapt to the new reality, but that took a whole century of well-documented horrors.  Economies can’t adapt overnight.  The private sector will not miraculously solve the problem.  The only way is for government to create the link that is broken. (Note there is another side of this picture–we all increasingly depend on a relatively limited group who make the difference for rest of us. We NEED to spend money on education and research and to restore our status as the destination for the best and brightest from everywhere.)

Despite all the propaganda to the contrary, government needs a bigger role in employment. This isn’t charity. Government needs to finance work that needs to be done but won’t get done by the private sector alone.  An obvious case is climate change, which will require monumental transformations well beyond the cost of the new equipment.  In this country we have the dubious distinction of currently paying for a huge, debt-financed, fossil-fuel-powered datacenter expansion–that will end up being reworked in short order for a cheaper sustainable successor whether we like it or not! There are also many other parts of the public sector that have been starved for years–for example in healthcare and education.  All of that sounds like a recovery plan from a depression—how to put people to work–but there’s a big difference: we have the money. As with the industrial revolution the problem is not a shortage of work or a shortage of money—it’s making the link.  This time we need to do it.

That isn’t a trivial problem, but it’s worth understanding it as THE economic challenge of our era.  In this we’re not talking about taxing companies in cut-throat price competition with each other–if anything our problem today is too much consolidation and sector monopoly behavior.  Tech companies operate with profit margins that would have been unthinkable in competitive industries. Google’s operating margin runs over 25%. Apple’s over 30%. Microsoft’s over 40%. But we do need to be careful to make taxation work effectively, and we need to avoid an international race to the bottom.  I’m not going to attempt to solve either here. But I will note that stock buybacks are a great indication that companies have more money than they know what to do with, and some kind of equity participation by the government is consistent with the value of the infrastructure provided. For the international side, we’ve done this sort of thing before–with labor standards and environmental regulations.

In fact I’d like to think we could perhaps take the international part a step farther. There are many reasons why the world today needs new forms of cooperation. This issue is everyone’s problem, and (as opposed to many other issues) it is rationally solvable. And it would also be economically stabilizing.  So if we can deal with this one, perhaps it is also a first step toward harder issues–such as nuclear proliferation or a political order to avoid war. We need to do this.

Lessons from Rare Earths

It’s weird that the press keeps discussing rare earths as a strange one-of-a-kind issue. As we noted here before that problem wasn’t an act of God—it was the Chinese figuring out something we didn’t.  We as a country were structurally incapable of planning for the future.  And we’re still that way. We haven’t always been quite so bad, but with the Republican private-sector orthodoxy and now Trump’s “intuitions” that’s where we are.

In that last piece I talked about slashed support for scientific research as a reason why we’re just waiting for the next such example to pop up.  But I should have been even more emphatic; there is an obvious example right now—our electrical infrastructure. We’ve mentioned that issue before in the context of climate change, but the impact goes further.

The US electric power network is antiquated, disorganized, and insecure. The Chinese could put it out of service any time they really wanted to. It needs major investment so that it can act as a resource for the economic development of the country.  This isn’t just a matter of tweaks—there is every reason to believe that that the electrical network is going to drive much more of the economy in the future than it does today.  That has to do with new power sources (e.g. fusion or other nuclear), new application areas (datacenters are just a first example), and also (whether we like it or not) climate change.  The network has to enable all kinds of new uses involving higher levels of electric power wherever it is needed.  China is already making huge investments, employing some higher-capacity technologies than we have here.

What are we doing?  We have to make major new investments to power the tremendous energy needs of the coming gigawatt datacenters.  But we aren’t even thinking about what that means for upgrades to our electrical network—we’re making it exclusively a matter for the datacenters themselves. And we’re prohibiting use of wind and solar in those datacenter projects—even though those are used in 90% of new electricity projects worldwide. There is no national project for development of a secure and capable electrical power infrastructure.  We’re going to build and power all of those datacenters and then figure out that hodge-podge of point solutions is no good for high-speed car charging (for example) or for other applications that will come out of China but not here. So we’ll just have to declare another emergency for the years it will take for the infrastructure to catch up.

We refuse to think beyond the immediate needs of today’s businesses. And that matters. Same as for rare earths.